In recent years, Las Vegas has seen several new owners and operators; Palms, Rio, Virgin and Cosmopolitan all changed hands, with Fontainebleau and Resorts World new to market. 

New brands arrived and, across the market, new leadership teams have taken control of iconic assets, implementing a range of divergent strategies. At this stage, none have had the success or acclaim of Apollo’s acquisition of The Venetian’s operating business. 

As an outsider, if not total newcomer, Apollo saw value at both the property and across the market, implementing a strategy and appointing leadership that offers significant insights to the wider industry.

The man with a plan 

Much has been written about Sheldon Adelson, both before and after his passing in 2021. 

Rob Goldstein, the long-time executive that succeeded Adelson as CEO of Las Vegas Sands, said of Adelson, “He saw Las Vegas as a multi-faceted entertainment experience. Rooms would be very valuable, food and beverage very valuable… conventions would be incredibly valuable. In those days, people laughed at conventions, they did not want that business…. It was gambling, gambling, gambling. Sheldon said that rooms were more valuable than gambling… he was incredibly correct.” 
In terms of coming to market and implementing a business strategy that had worked in other markets, but counterintuitive to the established narrative, Adelson was a trailblazer. Initially acquiring The Sands Hotel in 1989 and building the convention center in 1990, The Sands hotel was imploded in 1996 and The Venetian opened in 1999, with Palazzo following in 2007.

Adelson’s Venetian redefined the business model that was to drive Las Vegas’ growth for the subsequent generation. It was the first fully integrated resort in Las Vegas, blending retail, convention, an all-suite hotel, leisure amenities, entertainment and the casino. As non-gaming revenues (and customers) grew across the market, the casino was a secondary beneficiary to a more diversified revenue model: a win-win.

Sands was also an innovator by hiring smart, entrepreneurial, young executives from outside the industry to come to Las Vegas. Many of those early hires can be found across the city today, with continued impact on the industry. 

However, despite his success in Las Vegas, it was a bold move to enter Macau (when others were still undecided on the market) with Sands Macau opening in 2004, followed by investment and expansion in Cotai (on reclaimed swamp land), opening The Venetian Macao in 2007, followed by a Four Seasons, Sands Cotai (now The Londoner) and Parisian. The company operates over 12,400 rooms in the region, over 25% of the market. In 2024, The company generated over $7bn in revenue from the enclave. Marina Bay Sands opened in 2010, breaking records for performance in a casino resort. In 2025, the property reported $5.6bn in revenue. 

Witnessing the record-breaking casino performance in Asia, the business model that Adelson had originally conceived and proved had shifted; LVS was not just a conventions-driven hospitality company, but the global leader in gaming, and one of America’s largest companies. Indeed, transporting high-end gamers from high-tax locations to the more beneficial regime in Nevada was to prove lucrative to the bottom line of the company, turning the once gaming-agnostic property to home of some of the world’s highest rollers. 

The Las Vegas resort, impressive by most commercial metrics, was only a relatively minor part of the company’s revenues, as Covid-19 shuttered the global tourism economy. Company revenues shrank to nil. As others cut costs, Adelson, who’s own childhood was scarred by poverty in economic hardship, maintained the payroll.

However, after Sheldon Adelson’s passing, LVS sold the Las Vegas properties to concentrate on the Asian market. The identity of the new owners of The Venetian surprised many.

Sun, song, healing… and plague

If Steve Wynn is seen as the engine behind Las Vegas’ emergence in the late 1980s, his fuel was provided by Drexel Burnham Lambert’s junk bonds. Innovative financing for non-traditional businesses had been part of Las Vegas’ story for decades, long before “the original” junk-bond king, Meshulam Riklis, acquired the Riviera in 1973. However, that particular tool had proved both lucrative and effective for all parties long after Riklis’ departure. It was at Drexel’s originative deals team where Leon Black cut his teeth. After the bank’s demise, the entrepreneurial Black, and a handful of former Drexel employees, notably Marc Rowan and Josh Harris, founded Apollo, initially playing in the distressed finance arena (a field they understood well). 

Apollo continued to invest around the gaming space, but finally became the emperors of Las Vegas, when, in a joint bid with TPG, they agreed a leveraged buy-out of Caesars Entertainment. The rebranded Harrah’s had become a darling of investors, employing data science and sophisticated management models; the anthesis of the structures found at Adelson and Wynn’s properties, with the company continually outperforming expectations. The deal closed in January 2008. 
If the timing had been different, we could be writing a different story. 

The financial crisis and recession that followed the acquisition had disastrous consequences for both Las Vegas and the US gaming industry. Whereas Sands, Wynn and MGM had exposure to Asian markets, Caesars did not and, despite reinvestment, development, managerial changes and restructuring, bankruptcy and bitter lawsuits were to follow. The eventual outcome of a long process was the equity holders wiped out and, from the remaining embers, was the creation of a new, listed operating company for Ceasars’ properties, with the real estate being held in a newly created REIT, named somewhat controversially, Vici.

Vici has grown to own not just Caesars’ real estate assets, but collects rents from many established operators, including MGM and Hard Rock, in a growing portfolio of gaming and leisure property. The REIT has a market cap of over $30bn at time of writing. 

Despite the public fallout, financial loss, and heavy criticism of Apollo, the company continued to see value in the gaming industry, investing throughout industry verticals, from gaming manufacturers, service providers, suppliers and international operators. However, in a surprise to many, Apollo was ready to return to The Strip... as an operator. It was reported in March 2021 that Apollo, the one-time owner of Caesars, was paying $2.25bn for the Venetian Las Vegas’ operating business, alongside Vici, who had agreed a $4bn deal for the underlying real estate, in one of the largest single asset transactions in US history.

Questions were asked. Could this investment make a return considering the enormous price, how would it operate without the top-down vision of Adelson and, based on past experiences owning Caesars, could Apollo effectively manage America’s largest resort out of a generational pandemic?

Strategic overview of Las Vegas 

As addressed in multiple forums, successful strategy development follows three pathways. Firstly, identifying your customer and meeting their needs and loyalty drivers. Secondly, understanding the market and competitive environment and, third, developing or acquiring internal capabilities required to compete. Historically, this was set at The Venetian. Adelson knew the convention business arguably better than anyone; however, others had planted their tanks on his lawn. The city-wide offer had improved significantly, with Aria, Cosmopolitan, Mandalay Bay, Caesars Palace and Wynn all investing heavily in convention-led amenities and quality room additions, and the LVCVA had undertaken a huge expansion and modernization of their own product. 

The food and beverage offering on property, although outsourced operationally, had been re-curated to be market leading, after a period of relative underperformance. The retail had been sold to raise capital for Asian expansion. On the gaming floor, the property had ceded the gaming business to focus on the small group of high rollers, predominantly transported directly from Asia.

Indeed, the overall Las Vegas customer demographic had changed since the property had opened; it had become younger, more affluent and eager to be entertained, partying all day and all night. That wasn’t Adelson’s intended customer. 

Although operated externally, there was a planned expansion to Tao Beach Club after seeing the comparable performance in other properties, and the company announced support to the speculative (and much doubted) Sphere project that was under construction behind the convention center on land owned by the company. Adelson had always been cautious in entertainment investment, and the resort had eschewed joining the growing entertainment race, as The T-Mobile Arena, The Colosseum, Park Theatre, Chelsea Showroom, Gardens Arena and Allegiant Stadium had all joined the competitive landscape attracting big name talent, to the benefit of their associated resorts.

Looking citywide, in the early 2020s, newcomers Resorts World and Fontainebleau were poised to supplant The Venetian in the top-tier property range, and after the acquisition of the wildly popular and successful Cosmopolitan, MGM had added another premium resort to their portfolio. Hard Rock was coming out of the ground, directly across from The Venetian’s front door.

The Venetian under Adelson was significantly more top-down, reliant on a small number of high-end gamers, and operationally siloed than comparable Las Vegas operators. If Apollo was to drive a return on its investment, the challenges posed required not just financial muscle, but also strategic and operational guile. 

Driving force  

Undoubtedly Apollo’s team had acquired significant insights to operational challenges on The Strip from Caesars, but the case study for managing a successful turnaround belonged to private equity rivals, Blackstone, at The Cosmopolitan. Instrumental to that process was Patrick Nichols. 

Originally from Minnesota and working in hotels and hospitality from a young age, Nichols arrived in Las Vegas in 2008, with a degree in Hotel Administration from Cornell, to work in the finance team at The Venetian. As one of Adelson’s smart hires, Nichols opened Marina Bay Sands with the company before moving down the street to open The Cosmopolitan,  where he shaped the strategy of the property. The Cosmopolitan, like the Venetian had done in 1999, redefined the business model for The Strip, driving a new, younger, generation of customer to Las Vegas. Nichols completed his tenure at the property as General Manager and Chief Strategy Officer, one of the few executives holding this role on The Strip.

Although Apollo focused on distress, The Venetian was certainly not a distressed asset but, in February 2022, when the deal closed, there was still much uncertainty around the Las Vegas market. In 2021, visitation to market was 10 million fewer, some 24% lower, than in 2019. Midweek occupancy hovered above 60%, with only one-third of the typical convention customers returning. The conventional wisdom was that a full recovery was years away. 

Where others saw a market challenge, the new owners saw an opportunity. Considering the strategic challenges as set out above, plus the relative slowdown in business, competitors pulled investment and raised prices seeking to increase margins. The Venetian did the opposite and produced a near flawless case study for future casino owners.

Although successful, and certainly profitable, the new owners believed the Venetian had the potential to be more. The strategy started with meeting changing customer needs and addressing the increased competitor pressure, developing the capabilities required to compete at the highest level.

The $1.5bn of new capital invested saw a full renovation of the convention and meeting rooms, introducing specialist lounges for convention customers. Improvements were made to guest rooms and high-limit gaming areas. The additions to the gaming floor and restructuring of the Players’ Club saw the Venetian refocus on gaming customers, a segment the previous owners had not focused on. Taking the lead from the data-driven strategy found at Caesars, Nichols was also able to measure and monitor not just what was going on in the building, but who was there and understand various performance metrics that he hoped to improve, such as property EBITDA, slot revenue and overall customer mix.

Food, beverage and entertainment was further enhanced, with Voltaire, a boutique cabaret room hosting global superstars, demand for Kylie Minogue tickets literally breaking the website, with reported 700-hour wait times. Tao Beach reopened in summer 2022, bringing top-tier DJs and the party crowd to the property’s pool deck with more attractive economics, seeking to attract a more diverse customer base. 

On September 29, 2023, The Sphere finally opened with a residency from U2. Not since the Bellagio fountains first shot through the air to collective gasps of delight had there been such global attention at an attraction in the town, but this time, with amplified awareness thanks to social media, Las Vegas found an instant, new global icon…and it was at The Venetian. 

Like the Bellagio’s fountain, The Sphere attracted thousands of visitors to the Venetian each day to witness the spectacle; but unlike the fountains, each customer had committed to purchasing tickets to either a live show or a movie experience. These customers were likely to eat, drink or play prior to or after each show. Moreover, unlike a traditional Vegas showroom, and more like a sports venue or arena, The Sphere holds up to 20,000 people but, unlike those venues, tickets for various shows are available several times each day.

New ownership groups are frequently met with suspicion by longstanding employees, with new cultures, practices and management. At Blackstone’s exit of The Cosmopolitan, all employees received a cash bonus. Having employees share in the success of the property was not novel (at the Mirage, all day one staff received stock in the company), but to do so in such a public manner proved very effective in driving loyalty and engagement within the workforce. Apollo implemented the Venetian Las Vegas Appreciation Award, where based on performance, all employes benefit from the resort’s success. It was reported over $32m has been distributed in bonuses to employees since 2022. 

“Everything we do is to maximize the team performance and guest experience,” said Nichols. “It’s incredible what happens when you get your entire team to think like owners, because they are owners in the success of the resort.”

In 2025, Harvard Business School undertook a case study into Frontline Engagement as a Value Driver at The Venetian. It reported that EBITDAR had grown from $487m pre-pandemic to $777m in 2024. As the decade closes, with continued market evolution and strategy maturation, it is not inconceivable that The Venetian becomes the highest-performing property in the market. 

Strategic outcomes

In explaining the narrative behind the renewed success at The Venetian – and what seems apparently absent at many of the competitive resorts over the past five years – one must place a heavy emphasis on strategy. 

The initial positioning of the property, a legacy bequeathed by Sheldon Adelson, was ahead of its time, and while others had caught up, the core customer focus and infrastructure remained solid. As we have seen in plenty of examples, new owners seek to rebrand, reposition and even de-theme properties, with mixed success. By realigning the corporate and operating strategy to focus on established core customer needs for the 2020s and beyond, The Venetian once again is ahead of the pack within the target customer segment.

Furthermore, at a property with a history of contradictory decision making, the resort adopted a counter-intuitive post-Covid strategy. As others cut, The Venetian continued the investment plan, and the new owners made further investments, doing things properly for the long-term, not with the aim of capturing as much of today’s pie as possible, but knowing that tomorrow’s pie would be bigger, tastier and last longer. It proved prescient, and all key customer segments are rewarding the resort with their loyalty and repeat visitation. 

The decision to appoint Nichols as CEO and President of The Venetian was a bold move by Apollo. Frequently in Las Vegas, property leaders have significant operational expertise rising from casino or hotel but, in this specific role, at this particular time, entrusting a leader who prized strategy as a core proficiency has proved pivotal to outcomes.

It is often quoted that people make their own luck, which is certainly true (and although leadership made very astute, forward-thinking decisions to enable success), The Venetian also got lucky! Lucky that the conventions business bounced back faster and stronger than anyone anticipated, lucky that having been locked in during Covid, people wanted to get out and have fun with Las Vegas a beneficiary. Lucky that The Sphere confounded the pessimists’ expectations and became a global rockstar in its own right, and lucky that the potential rivals that sought to challenge The Venetian missed the mark on opening. 

The Renaissance arrives

Having spent 15 years researching, teaching and writing about strategy and strategic positioning of casino resorts, and over a decade working professionally in this city, this case study demonstrates many of the positions that I have long advocated; strategy matters, timing matters, people matter. 
The counterintuitive thinking of Sheldon Adelson – with the thesis that those in Las Vegas (and latterly Macau and Singapore) didn’t fully comprehend what they could have – were important reasons for the industry’s growth, positioning and narrative.

This same thesis is being replayed under the new ownership and management, with their own applied philosophies and understandings of today’s customer and the competitive landscape, believing that untapped potential and opportunities for growth remain. What we are seeing is a reimagining of what is possible in Las Vegas, and the heart of this renaissance can be found at The Venetian.

Oliver Lovat is the CEO of the Denstone Group. He consults on development and the strategic positioning of casino resorts.