Analysis

The cost of distrust: A brief history of Great Britain's drifting operator-regulator relations

Rob Jones, Global Gaming Insider contributor and legal & regulatory specialist, writes that Britain’s gambling industry, regulator and Government have became trapped in a relationship none seems able to repair...

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drifting apart
Key Points
Industry short-termism did not help to begin with, Jones writes, but nor did the regulator's increasingly oppositional stance
Great British gambling now shaped by polarised approaches
Without compromise, the current state benefits no one – and harms consumers

As any parent knows, doing the right thing does not always make you popular. But you hope your decisions will be understood and respected, even when they are unwelcome.

Regulation is not so different. The Gambling Commission does not need to be liked by the industry it oversees, but its decisions should command respect for their fairness, consistency and evidential foundations. Equally, operators cannot expect the regulator’s confidence without earning it through their own conduct. When
respect and confidence begin to erode on both sides, there is a danger that regulation becomes more about defending positions than preventing harm.

That increasingly appears to be the predicament facing Britain’s gambling industry.

Operators challenge the Commission’s evidence and decisions, while the regulator points to continuing failures and its duty to protect consumers. Government has substantially increased gambling taxation, adding further pressure. The industry’s own practices contributed to tougher intervention, while defensive responses compounded mistrust. Each institution can justify its decisions, yet no single institution appears accountable for its cumulative consequences.

An industry that outgrew its relationships

Two decades ago, Britain’s remote gambling industry was relatively small. At early Remote Gambling Association meetings, senior executives from competing businesses discussed common concerns. I used to describe the atmosphere, somewhat tongue in cheek, as “honour amongst thieves.”

We competed fiercely for customers but generally backed one another when collective interests were at stake.
Those were simpler times. The Gambling Act 2005 established the modern framework; the 2014 point-of-consumption reforms brought overseas operators serving British customers under the Commission’s licensing regime. As the industry expanded and regulatory obligations became more demanding, commercial interests increasingly diverged.

Risk-based requirements left operators discretion over when to examine customers' finances or intervene over signs of harm. Some differences reflected genuine uncertainty; others may have reflected incentives to avoid intrusive checks and lost revenue.

Cooperation continued: industry discussions included efforts to develop common approaches to affordability. Yet years later, the Commission found operators defining even deposit limits differently, some measuring gross deposits and others offsetting withdrawals. One operator’s caution could become another’s competitive disadvantage.

The question is no longer simply how the relationship can be repaired. It is whether those involved have sufficient reason to want to repair it, and what happens to the regulated market if they do not

Mobile gambling, in-play betting and increasingly sophisticated slots transformed accessibility and intensity. We knew technology was outpacing regulation, but less appreciated that it was also outpacing our understanding of its consequences, much as artificial intelligence does today. Yet unforeseen consequences differ from risks that become apparent but remain commercially inconvenient to address.

Online accounts recorded deposits, losses and behaviour, making potential harm more visible than in betting shops. Early in my career, I was the sole lawyer at a UK-facing gambling operator, without separate compliance, licensing, regulatory or responsible gambling functions. I was effectively all of them, without even realising it at the time. I remember a father calling after his son, a university student, had died by suicide following the loss of his grant money gambling online.

Nobody had specialist responsibility for such a conversation. I listened as he asked for the account to be closed. I have never forgotten it. I could not know the cause of his death, but the call exposed how ill-equipped we were to respond to serious harm.

Experiences like that should have prompted a broader industry discussion about the consequences of online gambling and how to protect customers. We already had relationships and forums through which we could have tackled emerging problems before the regulator imposed its own solutions. There is an uncomfortable irony here: we routinely united when our commercial interests were threatened yet were less effective when confronted with evidence of harm. The warning signs were already there, but the industry missed their significance or failed to respond collectively before the regulator began doing so on its behalf.

Why the warnings were already there for the Great British gambling industry

By the time Sarah Harrison became Commission Chief Executive in 2015, the industry had already had opportunities to recognise and address emerging risks. Her 2016 Raising Standards speech made the regulatory direction unmistakable, demanding better customer protection, money-laundering controls and internal systems.

Yet executives remained focused on acquisitions, growth and immediate performance. Commercial rewards arrived quickly; regulatory consequences could take years. I first encountered the consequences of delayed accountability as a paralegal working on tobacco litigation. I reviewed thousands of internal industry documents dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, including research into addiction and cancer, records of
advertising outside school gates and particularly disturbing research involving pregnant women.

What struck me was not simply what the industry knew, but how decisions made decades earlier could be scrutinised long after those responsible had moved on. Commercial decisions that appeared expedient at the time could become significant legal liabilities for the next generation of executives.

I was reminded of that lesson years later when reviewing high-value gambling customers. The question was not simply whether their funds came from legitimate sources, but whether they could reasonably afford to lose them. Everyone in the room understood the distinction. Yet VIP managers had revenue targets and bonuses tied to customer retention. Restricting play could prevent harm but cost a manager their reward. One person’s losses could contribute to another’s bonus. The conflict was obvious at the time, even if the regulatory consequences would not become apparent until a few years later.

The Commission was right to challenge arrangements where commercial incentives outweighed customer welfare. Too often, the industry understood the risks but failed to act upon them.

The industry's own practices contributed to tougher intervention, while defensive responses compounded mistrust. Each institution can justify its decisions, yet no single institution appears accountable for its cumulative consequences

From cooperation to confrontation

Regulatory intervention intensified. Government reduced fixed-odds betting terminal stakes in 2019; the Commission prohibited credit card gambling in 2020, restricted online slots design in 2021 and strengthened customer-interaction requirements in 2022. The industry welcomed some measures and broadly supported the 2023 Gambling White Paper.

But financial risk assessments became contentious. In 2026, the Betting and Gaming Council publicly challenged the Commission’s pilot evidence, even after the Commission announced a phased approach to implementation. Disagreement now concerned regulatory evidence as much as individual policies.

The Commission’s enforcement record illustrates another development. Earlier high-profile settlements exposed identifiable wrongdoing, including stolen funds being used to gamble and serious failures involving vulnerable customers. Inadequate policies and procedures were already central to these cases, but their consequences were often starkly visible.

Over time, enforcement placed increasing emphasis on whether preventative systems, risk assessments and customer monitoring were sufficiently effective, irrespective of whether specific instances of criminality or harm had been established. By December 2025, the Commission was describing failings at Done Brothers (Betfred) as predominantly technical breaches rather than matters arising from specific customer examples, while emphasising that deficiencies in anti-money laundering and safer gambling controls were nevertheless unacceptable.

This evolution was understandable. The purpose of effective controls is to prevent harm, not merely detect it afterwards. Nevertheless, it also helps explain growing tensions.

Operators that believed they had addressed earlier shortcomings could face further enforcement over the adequacy of their preventative systems. What the Commission saw as raising standards, some businesses interpreted as moving the goalposts. Harrison had signalled the direction years earlier, but broadly risk-based
obligations left room for different interpretations of what compliance required.

The cost of distrust extends beyond enforcement penalties. Operators become defensive, regulators more prescriptive, and both can spend more effort defending their positions than discussing emerging risks. Clarifications begin to feel like changes to the rules. The relationship becomes less capable of resolving problems before enforcement is necessary, potentially to the detriment of consumers.

The regulatory and fiscal pincer movement

Government has added substantial fiscal pressure. Remote Gaming Duty rose from 21% to 40% in April 2026; a 25% rate for most remote betting is scheduled for April 2027. The Commission sets neither rate, but operators experience taxation and regulation cumulatively.

At the same time, the Treasury abolished Bingo Duty, distinguishing between products it considers to present different levels of harm.

There is a wonderful irony in the Treasury’s decision to abolish Bingo Duty. One of the greatest blows to land-based bingo came not from gambling regulation, but from the smoking bans introduced across Britain in 2006 and 2007. Bingo halls depended heavily on gaming machines and interval games for their profitability.

Customers who previously spent their breaks playing those machines instead went outside for a cigarette. Alongside other pressures, a public-health measure aimed at tobacco profoundly damaged the economics of an entirely different industry.

Nearly 20 years later, government is using fiscal policy to achieve a deliberate outcome. The Treasury has explicitly stated that higher duty on online casino games and slots is intended to discourage operators from investing in and promoting those products, so that fewer people play them or become addicted. Damaging the economics of bingo was not the purpose of the smoking ban; reduced participation in particular gambling products is now an explicit objective.

Government is not seeking to eliminate gambling, but its definition of success may differ from an industry’s pursuit of a commercially sustainable market in which customers gamble responsibly. An industry seeking commercial relief may therefore be appealing to a government for which declining activity in some products is a desirable outcome.

The statutory position is more nuanced. The Gambling Act 2005, amended rather than replaced in 2014, requires the Commission to pursue its licensing objectives while aiming to permit gambling insofar as reasonably consistent with them. A separate economic growth duty requires regard to growth and proportionality. The Commission’s own principles emphasise evidence-based decisions and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens. None of this overrides consumer protection or makes the Commission responsible for taxation. But who considers the cumulative consequences?

An industry that failed to anticipate the longer-term consequences of its own decisions may now find itself exposed to decisions whose cumulative commercial impact receives insufficient attention.

Operators become defensive, regulators more prescriptive, and both can spend more effort defending their positions than discussing emerging risks... The relationship becomes less capable of resolving problems before enforcement is necessary, potentially to the detriment of consumers

Is the industry undermining its own arguments?

Yet the industry’s response may be compounding the problem. There is something of the pot calling the kettle black in its approach to evidence. The BGC questions whether the Commission’s financial risk assessment pilot justifies intervention, a legitimate challenge to which the Commission has responded.

Yet it also promotes forecasts that taxation or tighter rules will drive customers towards the ‘black market’. That market exists: bonuses, better odds and fewer restrictions can attract customers. But acknowledging why customers might gamble with unlicensed operators is not the same as demonstrating how many would actually do so in response to a particular policy.

In 2025, BGC-commissioned EY modelling projected £8.4bn ($11bn) in additional illegal stakes under a hypothetical tax proposal involving 50% Remote Gaming Duty, 25% General Betting Duty and 50% Machine Games Duty, rather than the Government’s subsequently introduced measures. That was a high-consumer-response scenario, and EY described its estimates as illustrative, not observed migration.

An industry demanding rigorous evidence from its regulator must apply equally rigorous standards to its own lobbying. Otherwise, it weakens the credibility it needs to restore. Tobacco litigation established that major manufacturers concealed or misrepresented evidence of harm; I make no allegation of equivalent conduct by gambling operators.

But public-health researchers have drawn comparisons between gambling industry lobbying and tactics historically employed by tobacco businesses. The danger for the gambling industry is that increasingly confrontational lobbying, particularly where its own evidence is open to challenge, may reinforce the perception that commercial interests are being placed ahead of consumer protection. That risks further undermining the industry's credibility with the very policymakers it needs to persuade.

Who actually wants a resolution?

Why assume government wants to reconcile the parties? It may see routine regulatory disagreements rather than a relationship requiring repair. Defending gambling businesses offers little political reward when reduced participation in some products is an explicit policy objective.

Consultation is not a commitment to restoring trust. The obstacle may be not simply poor communication, but increasingly different definitions of a successful regulated market.

Operators pursue commercial sustainability, the Commission its statutory objectives, and government its fiscal and political priorities, including harm reduction. These interests need not be incompatible, but each institution has become increasingly focused on defending its own position while overlooking its contribution to the wider problem.

The industry’s short-termism invited intervention; the Commission’s increasingly prescriptive approach and evolving expectations contributed to uncertainty and mistrust; defensive industry lobbying entrenched divisions; and government taxation amplified the strain. Each institution can justify its individual decisions, yet none appears willing to take responsibility for their collective consequences.

The question is no longer simply how the relationship can be repaired. It is whether those involved have sufficient reason to want to repair it, and what happens to the regulated market if they do not. With each institution consumed by the immediate dispute, the longer-term consequences risk being overlooked.

Gambling need not follow the path of tobacco, but is anyone looking far enough ahead to ensure that it does not?

Good to know

Stephen Hodgson has been appointed Gibraltar's next Gambling Commissioner

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